We argue that it is the number of agents holding market power, rather than the presence of market power itself, that may force Ricardian economies into autarchy. We apply the concepts of monopoly equilibrium by Baldwin (1948) to the model of Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) to show that, differently from the oligopoly case, trade always arises at a monopoly equilibrium whereas autarchy is never an outcome. As a consequence, monopoly Paretodominates oligopoly.
Introduction
The Ricardian principle of comparative advantage is a cornerstone of classical trade theory.
Absent any impediment to trade, countries specialize in the production of the good for which they enjoy a comparative advantage. As a consequence, competitive economies achieve productive efficiency and potential gains from trade are exploited. Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) -CG henceforth -pose the interesting question about "whether, and the extent to which, the use of market power by economic agents on the world market would alter the prediction of the Ricardian theory" (CG, p. 334) . The answer they provide is positive: market power may drastically affect the Ricardian outcomes. Indeed, in their insightful paper, CG demonstrate that in a wide class of Ricardian economies where all of the agents are endowed with market power, autarchy is the only outcome to be expected.
Their result is even more striking since they build up their model in such a manner to generate the highest incentives for agents to trade. This note complements the answer provided by CG, by analyzing the extreme case in which all the market power is concentrated in one agent only, namely, a monopolist. We will apply * I am grateful to G. Candela and A. Minniti for useful discussions and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. † Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna, piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy; email emanuele.bacchiega@unibo.it .
Model and Equilibrium The Model
Consider two countries, with one agent in each, denote these agents M and C. There are two consumption goods, 1 and 2. Each agent is endowed with a unit quantity of labor which is the only input for the production of the goods. Technologies are linear, the production frontier for agent i is described by the locus
, where a i l is the labor input used by agent i ∈ {M, C} to produce one unit of good l ∈ {1, 2}, and y i l is the quantity of labor assigned by agent i to the production that good. Like CG, we assume the following.
(1) Agent M has a comparative advantage in the production of good 1:
(2) Agent M has an absolute advantage in the production of good 1 and agent C in the production of good 2: 0 < a
(3) Each agent is only interested in the good for which he has a comparative disadvantage:
is the utility function of agent i, i ∈ {M, C}, and x l , l ∈ {1, 2} is the quantity of good l consumed.
Assumptions (1)-(3) guarantee the greatest incentives to trade. Indeed, at the unique competitive equilibrium of this model, each agent completely specializes according to comparative advantage, and the amounts produced are fully exchanged at the relative prices
This results in the competitive utility levels
By applying CG's oligopoly equilibrium (CG, page 339) to this example it is easy to show that the only expected outcome is autarchy. Each agent produces for self-consumption the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage only, and the potential gains from trade are therefore unexploited, see Figure 1 (b). The intuition, in this two-agent example, is straightforward. For any quantity of good 2 offered by the C-agent, the M -agent has a strategic incentive to increase its utility by reducing the supply of good 1 and therefore increase the consumption of good 2. Symmetrically, the same holds for the C-agent. Monopoly equilibrium Baldwin (1948) analyzes the trade equilibrium conditions of a two-agent economy in the cases of (i) "monopoly", (ii) "discriminating monopoly" and (iii) "pure competition". We will apply concepts (i) − (ii) to this model to find its monopoly equilibria.
2 To avoid confusion with the general concept of monopoly equilibrium we will refer to Baldwin (1948) "monopoly"
as "pure monopoly". The "pure monopolist" (p-monopolist, henceforth) sets prices for the two commodities and lets the competitive agent choose production and consumption according to utility maximization. The "discriminating monopolist" (d-monopolist) makes a take-it-orleave-it exchange offer to the comparative agent, that decides whether to accept it or not to trade. In the rest of the paper, let agent M be the monopolist.
(i) Pure Monopoly
The p-monopolist proposes a price vector, say [p1,p2] ∈ R 2 + , or, equivalently, relative prices
≡p, and lets agent C react to these prices. Three cases may occur.
, the competitive agent fully specializes in the production of good 1, and demands the same quantity of good 1 for consumption.
, the competitive agent is indifferent among producing any plan on its frontier, and demands a quantity
, the competitive agent fully specializes in the production of good 2 and
The p-monopolist setsp to obtain the highest possible quantity of good 2 in exchange for the least quantity of good 1. Thus, we can exclude all relative prices of case (c), because for all these prices agent C offers the same quantity of good 2, in exchange for a quantity of good 1 which is the larger the lowerp is. Similarly, all relative prices of case (b) are not an optimal choice for the p-monopolist, since at all these prices agent C does not produce good 2. The only alternative left to the p-monopolist is to setp = a C 1 a C 2 ≡p * , which is its optimal choice.
Indeed, atp * , agent C is indifferent among all production plans on its production frontier, and demands exactly . Any other labor allocation for the p-monopolist is not optimal, since either it reduces the quantity of good 2 for self consumption, without increasing the quantity of good 1 obtained from agent C (if y M >ȳ M ), or it cannot buy all of the good 2 produced by agent C atp * . The utility reached by the p-monopolist is
, which is larger than the autarchic one, while agent C enjoys its autarchic utility. This rules out the possibility that the p-monopolist chooses not to trade. Thus, the only pure monopoly equilibrium of this model features trade. , reacts in the best way to the given amounts and prices" (Baldwin, 1948, p. 756) . Let E = [e1, e2] ∈ R 2 be the exchange vector proposed by the d-monopolist to the C-agent. Its elements are the quantities the d-monopolist demands to agent C, negative values represent a quantity offered. The d-monopolist seeks to obtain the largest amount of good 2 in exchange for the least quantity of good 1 that makes agent C accept the deal. This quantity is
, the production for autarchic consumption by the C-agent. In fact, any lower quantity of good 1 in exchange for a positive quantity of good 2 would not make agent C willing to trade, whereas any larger quantity could be reduced and being still compatible with exchange. In return for this quantity, the d-monopolist can demand any combination of goods 1 and 2 on the production frontier of agent C. Thus, it will demand the quantity 1 a C 2 of good 2. Accordingly, the exchange vector proposed is Both monopoly equilibrium concepts applied to our example point to the same result. When market power is concentrated in one agent only, trade always arises at equilibrium, while autarchy never does. This result can be generalized in several directions. First, imagine that the distribution of comparative advantages is the same as in this paper, but agent C (agent M ) enjoys absolute advantages in the production of both goods. Agent M will still propose an exchange with relative (explicit or implicit) prices equal to the slope of the production frontier of agent C. In this case, agent M (agent C) will fully specialize according to comparative advantage, whereas agent C (agent M ) will specialize only partially. Second, assume that the monopolist faces a competitive fringe of identical agents. In this case, it will still exploit its market power to govern the allocation of resources. The volume of trade will depend on the production possibilities of the monopolist relative to that of the fringe. If the monopolist enjoys an absolute production advantage with respect to the whole fringe it will manipulate the terms of trade to induce the competitive fringe to specialize according to comparative advantage, and buy all of its production of good 2. By contrast, if the monopolist's production possibilities do not allow for absorbing all the production of the competitive fringe, the monopolist may decide to trade with a fraction of it only, or to trade with all C-agents, but in such a way to induce an individual partial specialization. In any case, specialization according comparative advantage, either partial or total, will emerge at equilibrium.
Finally, notice that the monopoly equilibrium outcome is Pareto-efficient, since the Magent's utility level is larger than the competitive one. Thus, to concentrate all the market power in one agent restores Pareto efficiency with respect to the situation where market power is uniformly distributed among (few) agents.
